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Abstract 
Progress in the study of relationships has depended in part on the recognition that relationships have 
properties not relevant to interactions or to the behavior of individuals, and may require additional principles 
of explanation. This has led to an emphasis on relationships as linking individuals. In this article we argue that 
relationship processes occur in the heads of individuals, with the participants having their own idiosyncratic 
views of the relationship as well as a shared one. The relationship is both affected by and affects the 
self-concepts of the participants, so that the influences of the self-concept may be critical for understanding 
the properties and dynamics of relationships Furthermore, consideration of the self-concept can assist in the 
integration of different but not necessarily incompatible explanations for the same relationship phenomena. 
In the course of the twentieth century, ques- 
tions concerning the nature of the “self” 
have been in and out of fashion. Toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, when intro- 
spection was respectable, the “self” came 
very much into vogue (James, 1890). With 
the rise of behaviorism, however, the study 
of subjective phenomena fell into disrepute 
among experimental psychologists, and it 
became the province of clinicians. In recent 
decades, partly as a result of the cognitive 
revolution, studies of the “self” are return- 
ing to favor (e.g., Baumeister, 1999; Modell, 
1993; Scheibe, 1998; Wylie, 1974/79). In 
studies of relationships, also, the role of the 
“self” is beginning to receive more recogni- 
tion but, we suggest, not all that it deserves. 
One reason that the “self” has not re- 
ceived more overt recognition in studies of 
relationships lies in the history of research in 
this area. Although there were of course 
precursors (Fincham, 1995), the specialized 
study of personal relationships is only two or 
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three decades old. Before that, psychology 
was concerned primarily with individuals or 
with groups of individuals. Such studies of 
relationships that did exist mostly involved a 
clinical approach, often top-heavy with 
theory, which focused on the particulars of 
individual cases and thus did not lend them- 
selves to the production of generalizations 
whose validity could be assessed. It became 
apparent that relationships, of prime impor- 
tance in the lives of nearly everyone, re- 
quired study in their own right. 
Three principles were basic in the sub- 
discipline that emerged. First, dyadic rela- 
tionships involve two individuals, and they 
concern what goes on between them. Sec- 
ond, they depend on cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral processes, and they involve 
a series of interactions over time between 
two individuals such that each interaction is 
affected by previous ones and perhaps by 
expectations of further interactions in the 
future. Third, relationships have properties 
in addition to those of the interactions on 
which they are based, and interactions have 
properties additional to those of individual 
behavior. For instance, the extent to which 
the partners reveal themselves about im- 
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portant issues to each other in the course of 
interacting is an issue irrelevant to the be- 
havior of an isolated individual (e.g., Hinde, 
1979). 
Such issues led to an emphasis on rela- 
tionships as linking individuals, and it be- 
came usual to write in terms such as “the 
relationship between A and B.” This has 
been taken to refer either to the relation- 
ship as perceived by an outsider or, more 
importantly, to the participants’ commonly 
held intersubjective view of the relation- 
ship. But the processes on which relation- 
ships depend go on, by-and-large, in the 
head of each participant, with partial inde- 
pendence from what is going on in the head 
of the other. For instance, A and B may 
both see their relationship in positive terms 
(the aspect held in common), but A may 
feel committed to the relationship while B 
does not. Perhaps, therefore, in addition to 
the emphasis proposed earlier by one of us 
(Hinde, 1972, 1979) and implicit in many 
current studies, we should think also of A’s 
relationship with B and B’s relationship 
with A. This implies both common ground 
in how A and B see the relationship and 
differences in how they do so. Relationship 
phenomena are incorporated into the self- 
system, so this implies further that modifi- 
cations to A’s self-system consequent upon 
formation of the relationship with B will 
differ in some respects from those to B’s. 
We are not suggesting that this involves 
a new approach, though it could imply a 
considerable change in emphasis. Many so- 
cial psychologists think in this way, and they 
devise their studies from this perspective, 
though this is seldom explicitly acknow- 
ledged. Such an approach is also important 
for many clinical psychologists. Many indi- 
viduals who seek help with a problematic 
relationship are convinced on the basis of 
past events that they are correct in their 
perception of what their partner thinks and 
feels, and the therapist may need to demon- 
strate that that is not necessarily the case, 
but part of a narrative that they have cre- 
ated in their own heads (Fitzpatrick, 1987). 
Indeed, this approach has a long history in 
clinical psychology. Freud (1917) wrote of 
relationships being transposed from the ex- 
ternal world into the self; Fairbairn (1952) 
wrote about relationships as endopsychic 
structures; Bowlby (1969) referred to the 
“internal working models” elaborated by 
each participant; and Laing (1969; Laing et 
al., 1966) differentiated A’s relationship 
with B from B’s with A. More recently, 
Stevenson-Hinde (cited in Stern, 1995; see 
also Stevenson-Hinde, 1990) has empha- 
sized how mother and baby form represen- 
tations of their interactions, which both in- 
fluence and are influenced by their internal 
working models, and may carry over into 
interactions with others. 
In this report we argue that research on 
relationships may be facilitated by greater 
attention to the self-systems of the partici- 
pants in three ways. First, the self-concept 
affects, and is affected by, how the partici- 
pants behave. Second, the self-system medi- 
ates the effects of culture on relationships. 
And third, a greater focus on the self-con- 
cepts of the participants may facilitate the 
integration of research and reconcile differ- 
ent explanations of the same relationship 
phenomena. To that end we emphasize for 
theoretical reasons, as have others on meth- 
odological/statistical grounds (Gonzalez & 
Griffin, 1999; Griffin & Gonzalez, 1995; 
Kenny & LaVoie, 1984; Manke & Plomin, 
1997), that two-person relationships should 
be studied both at the level of the dyad and 
of the individual, and that it is theoretically 
crucial to include the concept of the self in 
most studies of relational processes. 
The Self-concept 
If the processes on which relationships de- 
pend go on in the heads of the individuals 
involved, should the “self” be given more 
prominence in studies of relationships? 
One difficulty is that the concept of the 
“self” is a slippery one. “Self” is an every- 
day term. As we see ourselves behaving dif- 
ferently according to the situation, and as 
we see ourselves changing with age, we ac- 
count for the continuity in our lives by pos- 
tulating a self, and we assume that other 
people have “selves” too. 
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Writers on the “self” have often been 
shy of defining it precisely. However, re- 
cently Baumeister (1999) has indicated that 
three major human experiences form the 
bases of selfhood. These are: (1) The expe- 
rience of reflective consciousness: An indi- 
vidual is aware of self by observing how he 
or she behaves or by inference from social 
events. (2) Interpersonal being: The first 
things that a child learns about itself in- 
volve its connections with others, and social 
development consists largely of learning 
how to adjust one’s behavior according to 
partner(s) and context. In doing so, the in- 
dividual forms perceptions of relationships 
and contexts, some of which the person 
shares with others involved. (3) The execu- 
tive self, which makes choices, initiates ac- 
tion, and so on. On this view, the self exists 
both in the person’s own head and in the 
intersubjective world in which the person is 
immersed. These several aspects of the self 
echo the concerns of earlier writers. 
For James (1890) consciousness of self 
was an aspect of the stream of thought-r, 
perhaps more precisely, the stream of con- 
sciousness was the “self.” Because we talk 
about our own self, the question immedi- 
ately arises, who is it who is perceiving the 
own-self? James recognized an “I,” which 
does the perceiving, and a “Me,” which is 
the perceived, empirical self. He also distin- 
guished three constituents of the empirical 
self, differing in their concerns-the mate- 
rial self, concerned with objects, places, and 
so forth; the social self, concerned with in- 
teractions and relationships; and the spiri- 
tual self, concerned with speculations about 
ultimate reality. While emphasizing the 
unity and continuity of the self, related to 
the continuity in the individual’s stream of 
thought, James also referred to a plurality 
of selves, especially in the social sphere. 
Freud, rejecting phenomenology, made 
little use of the concept of “self,” but it was 
implicit in his structural concept of the 
“ego,” which he referred to as if it were an 
objective entity, or at least a coherent or- 
ganization of mental processes. 
Baldwin (1897), Cooley (1902), Mead 
(1934), and others developed related con- 
cepts of the self in which it is viewed as 
constructed by the individual as a conse- 
quence of interaction with others. More re- 
cently, several models concerned with how 
information is stored in the self-concept 
have been proposed (e.g., Bowlby, 1973; 
Fletcher & Fitness, 1996; Greene & Ged- 
des, 1988; Harvey, Agostinelli, & Weber, 
1989 Honeycutt, 1993). As might be ex- 
pected, there are considerable differences 
in detail concerning the concepts of the 
self, and how it functions, proposed by 
these investigators (see, e.g., Modell, 1993; 
Scheibe, 1998). For most, the information 
stored is seen as including aspects of rela- 
tionships with others, the social context, 
and norms. 
Scheibe (1998) distinguishes between the 
“self” and “identity” but again carefully 
avoids precisely defining either, except by 
example: Dead persons can have identity 
but no self; for many people, God has a self 
but no identity; and living persons have 
both. This may seem not to get us very far, 
but it serves to focus attention on an issue 
that can be treated with some degree of ob- 
jectivity, namely identity. Scheibe con- 
trasted “self” with “identity” and saw “iden- 
tity” primarily as how an individual is seen 
by others. But if we take a person’s identity 
to be what that person sees himself or her- 
self as being, then “identity” becomes close 
to “self-concept,” defined as the person’s 
“mental representation of his or her own 
personality” (Kihlstrom et al., 1988), or how 
a person describes and feels about him/ 
herself. Of course, individuals’ self-descrip- 
tions may not be “true.”For example, Winni- 
cott (1958) presented evidence that intru- 
sive mothers may lead infants to present a 
false outer self that does not represent the 
“real” inner experience. And although con- 
gruency appears to increase with age (Har- 
ter, 1998), a variety of defense mechanisms, 
conscious and unconscious, bias the pictures 
that people present of themselves toward 
how they would like to be seen (see below) 
or to how they see themselves as possibly 
becoming (Markus & Nurius, 1986). 
However, if active dissembling can be 
ruled out, how people would like to behave 
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is related to how they see themselves, as ex- 
emplified by the innumerable studies of 
how people evaluate themselves (self- 
esteem) (Baumeister, 1993). From here on, 
therefore, we shall evade the problem of the 
nature of the “self” and take “self” to refer 
to the “self-concept.” “Self-esteem” is taken 
to be one aspect of the self-concept. The 
difficulty in definition arises in part because 
it is difficult to define the “self” without re- 
ferring to the “self,” as in “The self-concept 
is how one sees oneself,” unless one uses 
James’s model and speaks of “how the I sees 
the Me.”’ That, however, is inadequate be- 
cause, as we shall argue shortly, the “self- 
concept” includes much more than “Me.” 
We are certainly not claiming that there 
is general agreement as to how the self- 
concept can serve as a precisely quantifi- 
able variable. We shall, however, argue that 
it can serve as means for integrating diverse 
aspects of relationships. 
Three features of the self-concept are 
relevant to the present discussion. First, al- 
though processes of maturation are in- 
volved (Kagan, 1989), it develops out of so- 
cial interaction: how we perceive ourselves 
is affected by how we perceive or have per- 
ceived others to perceive us (see above; 
Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995). Most im- 
portant are the views of those with whom 
we have or have had close relationships, 
and especially those in our family of origin 
(Bowlby, 1969). It is as though we tell our- 
selves stories based on our behavioral inter- 
actions, and use those stories to tell our- 
selves what sort of people we are (Gergen 
& Gergen, 1988). 
Thus, Schauger and Schoeneman (1979) 
reviewed 56 studies which tested the idea 
that one’s self-concept is a reflection of oth- 
ers’ perceptions and opinions of the self. 
There was little agreement between peo- 
ple’s self-perceptions and how they were 
actually perceived by others, with half of 
the studies showing no significant relation. 
However, consistent with our argument, 
there was considerable agreement between 
people’s self-perceptions and how they per- 
ceived others to perceive them. It thus 
seems that people do not accurately per- 
ceive others’ opinions of their selves, but 
that people’s self-concepts are related 
rather to their perceptions of others’ opin- 
ions, and thus to “A’s relationship with B” 
and vice versa (see also Fletcher & Fitness, 
1996; Gergen & Gergen, 1988; Harvey, We- 
ber, & Orbuch, 1990).l Comparison with 
others is of special importance in one as- 
pect of one’s self-concept, namely in how 
one evaluates oneself-one’s self-esteem. 
In five experimental studies, Leary, Tambor, 
Terdal, and Downs (1995) obtained con- 
vincing evidence that self-esteem varies as 
a function of perceived social acceptance 
versus rejection. Perceived social accep- 
tance was related to greater state self-es- 
teem (cf. Heatherton & Polivy, 1991); social 
rejection was related to less self-esteem. 
Second, and related to this developmen- 
tal issue, the self-concept should not be 
seen as a static structure, but as changing 
with age, situation, and so on (e.g., Harter, 
1998; Scheier & Carver, 1988). That it 
changes with age follows from a develop- 
mental perspective, for development con- 
tinues throughout life. In addition, people 
see themselves differently according to the 
situation they are in. For instance, children 
and adolescents tend to see themselves dif- 
ferently in home and school, emphasizing 
passivity more in the family context, activ- 
ity in the school; and individuals refer to 
their ethnic background when they belong 
to a group, which is rare in their situation, 
and to their sex if they are in a minority sex 
at home (McGuire & McGuire, 1988). In 
other words, how people see themselves is 
context dependent. Harry Stack Sullivan 
went so far as to suggest that each person 
had as many personalities as he has inter- 
personal relationships (Perry, 1982, p. 108). 
Thus, in view of such findings, the self 
may be seen not as a unitary structure, but 
1. Authors differ in the precise nature of the relations 
between the individual, others, and society. Fur- 
thermore, whereas social psychologists have 
tended to see the relations between individual and 
society as generally positive, Freud and other psy- 
choanalysts saw the individual as primary and 
tended to see individual and society as opposed 
(Scheibe, 1998). 
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as multiple, or as networks and hierarchies The Self-concept and Relationships 
of increasingly context-specific self-con- 
cepts (Kihlstrom et al., 1988). Individuals 
behave as though they were choosing be- 
tween the many selves they might be. This 
may involve selecting according to outside 
influences (e.g., peer pressure), or according 
to one’s perceptions of one’s abilities, there- 
by enhancing one’s self-esteem. Baumeister 
(1998), however, puts the emphasis slightly 
differently: Pointing to the difficulty of 
maintaining different personalities in differ- 
ent social contexts, he argues that different 
others know the same self but that different 
aspects of this same self are activated in dif- 
ferent contexts. In either case, each view im- 
plies that the self-concept must include, or 
imply, information about the several con- 
texts in which it operates.2 Such contexts 
include the various relationships in which 
the individual is involved. Whether it is pref- 
erable to regard such information as exist- 
ing within the self-concept, or as readily 
available to it, is a matter that need not 
overly concern us. In some contexts the 
term “self-system,” seen as embracing the 
self-concept and the relevant contexts, 
seems preferable. To ensure that that issue is 
kept in mind, we use “self-system” as an al- 
ternative where it seems especially appro- 
priate. 
Third, the self must be seen as an active 
agent, providing expectancies and directing 
attention to whatever is of significance to 
the individual: This function James (1890) 
ascribed to the “I.” There is, of course, po- 
tential circularity here, for we may judge 
whether an object is significant by whether 
the individual pays attention to it. But more 
importantly, as discussed below, individuals 
actively seek to maintain, integrate, en- 
hance, or expand the self. We shall see later 
that this activity affects many of the proper- 
ties of relationships. 
2. It is reasonable to suggest that the functioning of 
the self-concept has been shaped by natural selec- 
tion. In the course of human evolution, reproduc- 
tive.success must have depended in part on the 
ability to fit behavior to the situation, and to moni- 
tor that one is doing so. 
One aim of this article is to suggest that it is 
essential to study both what goes on be- 
tween individuals, and what goes on within 
individuals, and that the self-concept is an 
underused tool in this endeavor. Here we 
consider relations between the self-concept 
and behavior, including the ways in which 
individuals try to maintain and expand the 
self, and the relation of the self-concept to 
relationships. 
The self-concept and behavior. 
There seems to be some relation between 
how one sees oneself and how one behaves. 
For instance, the form of messages ex- 
changed in conversation is much influenced 
by the sender’s assessment of his or her 
status relative to that of the recipient 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987; Holtgraves & 
Yang, 1992). As another example, the re- 
ception of an offer of social support is af- 
fected by the extent to which it affects the 
recipient’s self-esteem (Fisher, Nadler, & 
Whitaker-Alagna, 1982). 
This notion was elaborated especially by 
Goffman (1959), though he viewed the self 
as more ephemeral than is suggested here. 
On his view, individuals in interaction pro- 
ject their own definition of the situation, in 
conformity with their own traditions and 
experience. Each thereby influences the 
“definition of the situation” of the other. In 
a successful interaction, a single definition 
of the situation is constructed, and both 
partners build up lines of constructive ac- 
tion. This process involves adjustments to 
how they see themselves. Applying this idea 
to a succession of interactions within a rela- 
tionship, the participants would bring to 
each interaction a self-concept changed by, 
or having access to, experiences of previous 
interactions. 
Influences between the self-concept and 
behavior operate in both directions. In the 
case of conversation and relative status, the 
self-concept affects behavior. Behavior is 
also likely to affect the self-concept, be- 
cause both how we see OUT own behavior 
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and how we see others behave toward us 
affect how we see ourselves. However, some 
interactions are influenced by the self- 
concept but leave it little affected. Thus, a 
self-important individual who sees himself 
to have been insulted may expostulate but 
leave the situation with his self-concept lit- 
tle changed. By contrast, falling in love may 
be related to profound changes in the self- 
concept; the lover may feel himself or her- 
self to be transformed. Aron and Aron 
(1986,1995) picture the formation of a close 
relationship as including the other in the 
self-a metaphor for describing how the 
self becomes modified as a consequence of 
interacting with the other (see below). Hus- 
ton and Houts (1998, pp. 140-141) found 
“substantial and consistent correlations be- 
tween both men’s and women’s personality 
characteristics and the spouse’s behaviour 
in marriage, their feelings about each other 
and the relationship, and the beliefs they 
have about each other’s personality charac- 
teristics.” 
Congruency An aspect of mutual influ- 
ences between self-concept and behavior, 
which is of special significance for interper- 
sonal relationships, concerns the mainte- 
nance of “congruency.” The self-concept 
provides continuity through the changing 
scenes of life, and much of our behavior can 
be seen as attempts to maintain its consis- 
tency. Thus, many aspects of human behav- 
ior can be understood on the assumption 
that we seek to validate the views we have 
of ourselves. Individuals tend to defend the 
constancy of their self-concepts and to be- 
lieve that, although experiences may affect 
them, they remain essentially the same per- 
sons. Backman (1988) has suggested that 
this process involves maintaining “congru- 
ency” between how we see ourselves, how 
we see ourselves behaving, and our percep- 
tions of the relevant behaviors, feelings, and 
perceptions of others. Hence, a woman who 
sees herself as honest, perceives herself to 
be behaving honestly, and finds that others 
seem to trust her, experiences congruency. 
However, if other people seem not to trust 
her, she experiences lack of congruency. 
Lack of congruency is seen as threatening, 
and people attempt to adjust their percep- 
tions, narratives, or behavior to restore con- 
gruency. Among the ways in which they do 
this are: 
1. Cognitive restructuring. One may mis- 
perceive one’s own behavior (“I was be- 
having honestly, really”) or that of oth- 
ers (“They do not really understand the 
complexity of the issues”); attend selec- 
tively to evidence that confirms one’s 
self-concept (“Do not listen to him; he 
judges others by himself and never trusts 
anyone”); or interpret the behavior of 
others to support one’s self-concept ( “It 
is not that he is kind-hearted; he lends 
me money because he trusts me”). 
2. Selective evaluation. Altering the rela- 
tive importance of items to augment 
congruency (Not noticing the hesitation 
before another agrees to lend one 
money). 
3. Selective interaction. Associating with 
others who provide congruency (Avoid- 
ing those who might doubt one’s hon- 
esty). 
4. Response evocation. Behaving in such a 
way that others confirm one’s self-image 
(Striving to appear open and straightfor- 
ward). 
5. Selective comparison (Contrasting one- 
self with someone known to be dishon- 
est). 
Such processes, mostly subconscious, 
tend to preserve the self-concept. The as- 
pects of the self-concept involved will, of 
course, vary with the nature of the relation- 
ship. 
This point raises the question of the rel- 
ative importance of maintenance of the 
self-concept in comparison with either the 
desire to maintain a favorable view of the 
self or to see oneself accurately. Sedikides 
(1993) conducted a series of studies to com- 
pare the potency of the self-enhancement 
motive, the self-verification motive (i.e., at- 
tempts to maintain congruency in the self- 
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concept; Swann, 1987), and the self-assess- 
ment motive (attempts to gain accurate 
knowledge about the self). Manipulating 
the type of feedback that subjects obtained 
about their self-concepts, Sedikides exam- 
ined whether preference for feedback var- 
ied across the three types of motives. In all 
of six experiments the self-enhancement 
motive was the strongest, followed by the 
self-verification motive. The self-assess- 
ment motive was by comparison not very 
influential. Thus, perceiving oneself accu- 
rately appears to be a less powerful motive 
than seeing oneself in a positive light. How-’ 
ever, outside the laboratory motivational 
accessibility may be affected by the nature 
of the relationship: Swann, de la Ronde, and 
Hixon (1994) found that individuals in dat- 
ing relationships rated their satisfactionhn- 
timacy lowest if the partner’s appraisal were 
less positive than the subject’s self-rating, 
higher if it were the same, and highest if it 
were greater. By contrast, married couples 
rated their own satisfactiodintimacy high- 
est if their partner’s view coincided with 
their own. The investigators suggest that 
courtship is a period in which partners 
evaluate each other and want to be seen 
favorably, whereas married individuals pre- 
fer that their partners perceive their weak- 
nesses as much as their strengths. 
Quality and expansion of the self-concept 
In keeping with the importance of the self- 
enhancement motive, Steele (1988) has 
pointed out that individuals do more than 
preserve congruency, in that they strive to 
sustain a self-concept that is competent, sta- 
ble, good, well-integrated, and so on. Evi- 
dence for this view includes the finding that 
a threat to one aspect of the self may be met 
by affirming another central and highly val- 
ued aspect. 
Furthermore, individuals tend simulta- 
neously to expand the self, as occurs in the 
formation of a close relationship, and to 
enhance their self-esteem. Thus, individuals 
seek out relationships that enable them to 
express characteristics they believe to be 
self-defining, and which will lead to them 
being evaluated positively. Aron and Aron 
(1986) found that the number of content 
domains (e.g., social status, family relation- 
ships, major emotions) in students’ self- 
descriptions increased as a consequence of 
falling in love, which was associated also 
with enhanced self-esteem and self-efficacy. 
Individuals are also motivated to main- 
tain momentary states of positive evalu- 
ation. They tend to associate with others 
who are superior to themselves in activities 
that are not self-relevant, thereby basking in 
reflected glory, or with others who are infe- 
rior to themselves in activities that are self- 
defining, thereby profiting from the com- 
parison (Tesser, 1988; Pilkington, Tesser, & 
Stephens, 1991). In the longer term, forming 
new relationships, the search for novelty, 
and the desire to explore can all be seen as 
involving expansion of the self-concept. 
Maintenance of the self-concept and ex- 
pansion of the self-concept can be seen as 
contradictory desiderata. However, some 
relationships involve both maintenance and 
expansion. Thus, Wright (e.g., 1984) stresses 
that friendships are formed because they 
facilitate the goals that people have with 
respect to their self-concept. These include 
self-esteem, confirmation of issues that one 
feels to be positive about oneself, and sup- 
plying new ideas and perspectives. Diverse 
functions of friendship have been postu- 
lated (Auhagen, 1996), but many of them 
seem to refer to the maintenance and ex- 
pansion of the self-a feeling of belonging, 
emotional integration, and stability; the 
opportunity to discover oneself; spiritual, 
emotional, and physical support; and show- 
ing evidence that one is valuable as a per- 
son. 
Actor, partner, and relationship effects. 
In recent years, the literature has empha- 
sized that focusing on only one partner gives 
an incomplete picture of what is going on in 
a relationship (e.g., Bartle-Haring, Kenny, & 
Gavazzi, 1999; Cook, 1993; Kenny & Kashy, 
1991). To rectify this, Auhagen (1987) ob- 
tained diary records from both partners of 
friendships, but few have followed her lead. 
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In a more artificial situation, a number of 
studies have examined both participants’ 
perceptions of an interaction (e.g., Noller, 
1987). 
Another route for studying relational 
phenomena and processes involves consid- 
ering interactions between partners in rela- 
tionships, or between all members of a fam- 
ily or social group (Dindia, Fitzpatrick, & 
Kenny, 1997; Manke & Plomin, 1997). The 
Social Relations Model (SRM) was devel- 
oped to enable separation of the variance 
associated with each partner from that as- 
sociated with the relationship itself (Kenny 
& LaVoie, 1984). This model involves ob- 
taining data from each member of a rela- 
tionship or group concerning their judg- 
ments of one another or their behavioral 
interactions. This procedure permits assess- 
ment of (a) Actor effects-a person’s ten- 
dency to behave in a similar way to every 
partner or to perceive all partners in a simi- 
lar way; (b) Partner effects-a person’s 
tendency to elicit similar behavior or per- 
ceptions from others; (c) Relationship ef- 
fects-factors that are unique to the par- 
ticular relationship between A and B; and, 
if applicable, (d) Family or group ef- 
fects-behaviors or perceptions that are 
shared by and/or affect all members in a 
family or group. The variance due to each of 
these effects can then be assessed. On the 
whole, research based on this paradigm in- 
dicates that both actor and relationship ef- 
fects are important, and Kenny has repeat- 
edly stressed the need to study both. This 
approach is in keeping with the view 
expressed here that “A’s relationship with 
B” and “B’s relationship with A” are impor- 
tant as well as the “relationship between A 
and B.” 
We would make two further points. First, 
the SRM provides an important step to- 
wards differentiating the variance due to 
individuals from that due to the relation- 
ship itself (though there may be contamina- 
tion by error variance) but does not (yet) 
enable researchers to evaluate the roles of 
the participants’ self-concepts in a particu- 
lar relationship. 
Second, it must be remembered that in- 
dividuals are affected by their relationships. 
If the relationship between A and B affects 
A’s self-concept and thereby A’s behavior 
in other relationships, we can say that a 
relationship effect in one context has be- 
come an actor effect in another. The unidi- 
rectional effects implied by the SRM may 
become bi-directional over time. 
In summary, we propose that the SRM 
suggests a route into the nature of relation- 
ships that is compatible with our emphasis 
on the importance of considering both A’s 
relationship with B as well as B’s relation- 
ship with A, but does not yet provide an 
adequate picture of the dynamic processes 
between self and relationships. 
Properties of relationships 
We have seen that relationship formation 
involves adjustments to the self-concept, or 
at least some degree of compatibility be- 
tween the self-concepts of the participants. 
As an extension, many of the properties of 
relationships can be seen as related to the 
self-concept. Elsewhere it has been sug- 
gested that 12 categories of dimensions are 
useful as pigeon-holes for the description of 
relationship characteristics, though with no 
implication that they are all-inclusive or in- 
dependent (Hinde, 1997). In the following 
paragraphs, we address briefly each of these 
categories and point to the importance of 
the self-concept in each. While all the di- 
mensions depend on both partners, they 
differ according to whether they are per- 
ceived similarly or differently by the par- 
ticipants, and thus whether A’s relationship 
with B differs from B’s relationship with A: 
(1)-(4). Four of the categories are proper- 
ties of the dyad. These are the Content 
and Diversity of the interactions (that is, 
what the participants do together), and 
the Reciprocity and Complementarity of 
the interactions (that is, whether the part- 
ners behave similarly in the interactions, 
as when A kisses B and B kisses A, or in 
ways that are different but complemen- 
tary, as when one dominates and the other 
submits). Such properties of interactions, 
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as well as their qualities (see below), 
could be described in a number of ways. 
For instance, Goffman (1959) would take 
a “dramaturgical perspective” and argue 
that each participant tries to “define the 
situation” in a way that both satisfies her 
or his own aims and will be acceptable to 
the other. Backman (1988) might argue 
that each acts to maintain congruency. In 
no way incompatible with these ap- 
proaches, we suggest that such properties 
can be seen as resulting from each partner 
striving to act, or to induce the partner to 
act, in harmony with how she or he sees 
herself or himself in that relationship- 
that is, in harmony with one’s own self- 
concept 
( 5 )  and (6). The Qualities of the interac- 
tions, and other Qualities that arise from 
the relative frequency and patterning of 
the interactions (for instance, the fre- 
quency with which partners go to the cin- 
ema together relative to the frequency 
with which each wants to go to the cin- 
ema) depend on both partners, but may 
be perceived differently by each. Thus, a 
traveler seeking directions may perceive 
the response as brusque, although the re- 
spondent feels he or she has been helpful. 
Though the quality of an interaction as 
seen by an outsider depends on both par- 
ticipants (the traveler may or may not 
have requested directions politely), per- 
ceptions of its qualities may differ be- 
tween the participants, and must be seen 
as consequences of (as well as, perhaps, 
influences on) the self-concepts of the 
participants. Thus, the quality of an inter- 
action may differ between A’s relation- 
ship with B and B’s relationship with A. 
(7). The next category concerns the in- 
cidence and nature of Conflict in the rela- 
tionship. Three of the commonest sources 
of conflict-autonomy versus related- 
ness, self-disclosure versus privacy, and 
predictability versus novelty (Baxter, 
1988, 1990)--can all be rephrased in 
terms of maintenance and expansion of 
the self-concept. Autonomy (acting with- 
out external constraints) involves a feel- 
ing of inner endorsement of one’s actions 
(Deci & Ryan, 1987) and thus the unfet- 
tered expression of the self-concept, 
whereas relatedness involves some con- 
straints on the self-concept in order to re- 
late to the other and thereby expand the 
self. Self-disclosure involves exposing the 
self-concept to influences that may elicit 
change and perhaps lead to expansion; 
privacy involves the denial of that possi- 
bility, and the maintenance of the current 
self-concept. Predictability implies con- 
sistency in the self-concept; novelty; im- 
plies the possibility of expansion or 
change. Another source of conflict, jeal- 
ousy, also involves a threat to the self- 
concept: The individual’s self-perception 
as “special” or “best beloved” is not 
shared by the partner (e.g., Buunk & 
Bringle, 1987). In other words, all these 
types of conflict stem from infringements 
of, or threats to, the self-concept. 
In all these cases, provided neither 
partner suppresses her or his feelings, the 
occurrence of conflict is likely to be 
shared by both partners. However, they 
may differ in their views of its quality, 
meaning, or significance for the relation- 
ship. Thus, while the occurrence of con- 
flict is a property of the relationship, per- 
ceptions of its nature must be seen as 
located within their heads and differing 
between them. Therefore A’s relation- 
ship with B will differ from B’s rela- 
tionship with A. 
(8). The distribution of Power in a relation- 
ship is very difficult to assess, and depends 
on the level of analysis. As mentioned 
above under the more general issue of 
complementarity, negotiations that lead 
to power differentials involve the self- 
concepts of the participants. If the part- 
ners agree as to which of them has the 
power in an interaction, power can be 
seen as a property of the dyad. However, 
they may not agree. Suppose that A sees 
himself as a great footballer, and B sees 
herself as a loving and indulgent wife. If A 
plays football on a Saturday afternoon, A 
may feel he is in control, but B may feel 
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that she is in control because she likes to 
let A do what he wants to do. In such a 
case the partners differ in their perception 
of where the power lies, and it becomes a 
property that must be seen as located 
within the heads of the participants: It is 
then better to distinguish A’s relationship 
with B from B’s with A, and consideration 
of how the participants see themselves 
(their self-concepts) provides greater un- 
derstanding. 
(9). Self-disclosure can be seen as a way of 
acquainting the partner with how one 
sees oneself (i.e., one’s self-concept or 
self-system), perhaps so that the partner 
will act in a way that maintains one’s own 
congruency. It may also reveal oneself as 
different from the views of the partner; 
while this may make one more vulnerable, 
it may also be constructive in fostering 
relationship growth and be used as a 
means to that end. Over relatively trivial 
matters, individuals tend to differ consis- 
tently in self-disclosure, but over more 
sensitive issues the amount of disclosure 
is a property of both participants,for there 
may be issues that A discloses to B but 
would not dream of telling C. Such disclo- 
sures are thus due to the special proper- 
ties of B or of the relationship between A 
and B (Miller, 1990). The degree of reci- 
procity in disclosure varies with the type 
and nature of the relationship. In pre- 
dominantly complementary relation- 
ships, such as those between doctor and 
patient or teacher and pupi1,reciprocity in 
disclosure is usually absent. In potentially 
close relationships, however, self-disclo- 
sure tends to be reciprocal (e.g., Berg & 
Derlega, 1987; Cozby, 1973; Miller & 
Kenny, 1986). New acquaintances match 
each other’s level of disclosure (Cunning- 
ham, Strassberg, & Haan, 1986). Once a 
relationship has been established, how- 
ever, immediate self-disclosure reciproc- 
ity seems to occur less frequently (Der- 
Petronio, & Margulis, 1993). Thus, the 
extent to which self-disclosure is an indi- 
vidual characteristic, stemming from the 
self-concept of the individual, varies ac- 
cording to the nature of the relationship. 
(10). Interpersonal perception concerns the 
extent to which each partner sees the 
other as she or he “really” is, and as each 
sees himself or herself, and the extent to 
which each feels understood. Both A and 
B will have views of each of these factors. 
Such issues are clearly related to the 
self-concept, for how A perceives B and 
A’s relationship with B is influenced by 
how A sees him/herself. This issue was 
stressed by Laing (1969) in differentiat- 
ing between A’s relationship with B and 
B’s with A. 
-1). A large element in Satisfaction de- 
pends on whether one believes that the 
partner sees one as one would like to be 
seen. While Veroff, Douvan, Orbuch, and 
Acitelli (1998) found wide variation in 
the factors that make for happy mar- 
riages, the sense of self-affirmation in the 
marital relationship was one of the most 
important. 
Another important issue concerns the 
extent to which the expectations inherent 
in an individual’s self-concept about his 
or her role in a relationship correspond 
with the actual interactions that occur 
(Alexander & Higgins, 1993; Kelly & 
Burgoon, 1991; MacDermid, Huston, & 
McHale, 1990 Yogev & Brett, 1985). 
With the changes in social norms for gen- 
der relations, gender differences in be- 
havior conductive to happy relationships 
have changed. Relationships in which the 
woman is more egalitarian or less tradi- 
tional than the man tend to involve less 
satisfaction (Li & Caldwell, 1987), espe- 
cially postpartum (Fitzpatrick, Vangelisti, 
& Firman, 1994; Hackel & Ruble, 1992; 
Voelz, 1985). 
lega, Wilson, & Chaikin, 1976)-perhaps 
because the partners have more time to 
respond to each other (Derlega, Metts, 
(12). Finally, one way of conceptualizing 
Commitment to a relationship is in terms 
of the extent to which the self-concept is 
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seen as embracing the other; as noted 
above, this is a metaphor used by Aron 
and Aron (1986) for loving. If the other 
(or the relationship with the other) be- 
comes part of the self-concept (or self- 
system), one strives to maintain it. Again, 
this property may differ between A’s re- 
lationship with B and B’s with A. 
Thus, many of the properties of relation- 
ships can be translated into aspects of the 
self-concepts of the participants-with only 
some aspects of the relationship repre- 
sented similarly inside the heads of the par- 
ticipants. Hence, we would argue that a 
focus on the self-system would greatly fa- 
cilitate the study of relationships and would 
aid understanding of the relations between 
their properties. Furthermore, such a focus 
implies that the nature of a relationship not 
only is influenced by, but also influences, 
the self-concepts of the participants. Like 
Ickes and Gonzalez (1996), we would plead 
for the necessity of studying both the sub- 
jective (A’s idiosyncratic view of the rela- 
tionship) and the intersubjective (A’s and 
B’s shared perception of the relationship) 
for more complete understanding of rela- 
tionship processes. 
The Self’-System and Culture 
Culture is yet another sphere that reflects 
the importance of the self-concept for the 
understanding of relationships and rela- 
tionship phenomena. The culture in which 
people are socialized influences their self- 
concepts (or is embraced within their self- 
systems). To illustrate this point, we focus on 
one dimension of cultural difference. This 
has been characterized by Markus and col- 
leagues (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991) as 
involving independent cultures (especially 
Western cultures), in which the focus is on 
individuality and autonomy, versus interde- 
pendent cultures (especially Asian cultures) 
where the focus is on relations with others. A 
comparable formulation is the dimension of 
individualism-collectivism (Triandis, 1988). 
In interdependent or collectivist cultures, 
the needs, norms, and goals of the ingroup 
take precedence over those of the individ- 
ual, whereas, the reverse holds for inde- 
pendent or individualist cultures. Members 
of interdependent cultures tend to be more 
concerned about others, and individuals are 
expected to subordinate personal feelings to 
the goals of the ingroup (Fiske, Kitayama, 
Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Hofstede, 1991), 
whereas in independent cultures the indi- 
vidual’s task is to become independent from 
others by attending to her or his own wishes 
and needs (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). It is 
hardly surprising that attitudes toward rela- 
tionships are related to this dimension of the 
cultural background. 
For instance, in a Canadian study Dion 
and Dion (1993) found that young adults 
from Chinese and other Asian backgrounds 
endorsed a “love as friendship” style more 
strongly than did those from Anglo-Celtic 
or European ethnocultural backgrounds. 
Among immigrants, tensions can arise as the 
result of differences between the internal- 
ized culture acquired during socialization 
and the current cultural environment. De- 
sires for greater autonomy and self- reliance, 
arising from the values of the host society, 
may conflict with fears of separation from 
the group, arising from socialization experi- 
ences (Vaidyanathan & Naidoo, 1991; Dion 
& Dion, 1996). Thus, Dion and Dion (1996) 
advocate distinguishing psychological indi- 
vidualismkollectivism at the personal level 
from this dimension at the societal one. 
Within any given society there will be in- 
dividual differences in individualismkollec- 
tivism, and this can readily lead to differ- 
ences between the ways in which partners 
view their relationship. Using self-actualiza- 
tion as a personality dimension that reflects 
individualism, Dion and Dion (1996) found 
that self-actualized people seemed to enjoy 
the experience of being in love more than 
did their less self-actualized peers, but the 
latter seemed to care more for their part- 
ners. In other studies, psychological indi- 
vidualists were found to be more likely to 
view “love as a game” and to have a less 
positive attitude toward marriage (Dion & 
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Dion, 1996). Thus, differences in the self- 
concept, arising from early socialization in 
the culture of rearing, affect behavior in re- 
lationships, and discrepant attitudes arising 
from differences in culturally influenced 
values may require us to make a distinction 
between A’s relationship with B and B’s re- 
lationship with A. 
Integrating Explanations for Relational 
Phenomena by Using the Self-Concept: 
Two Examples 
We do not wish to overemphasize the utility 
of the self-concept in explaining aspects of 
the dynamics of relationships. However, the 
above considerations do suggest that stud- 
ies of relationships can profit from consid- 
ering the self-concepts of the participants, 
and how they affect and are affected by 
interactional behavior. 
A further issue concerns the need for 
integration in research on personal rela- 
tionships. Studies have used diverse tech- 
niques, and a number of theoretical frame- 
works. The diversity of approaches has led 
to numerous instances of different but not 
necessarily incompatible explanations for 
the same phenomenon. In some such cases 
different explanations may be suitable for 
different instances or circumstances, but in 
other cases reformulation of the explana- 
tion in terms of the self-concept may ame- 
liorate the confusion. 
As one example of the need for integra- 
tion, many explanations have been given 
for the finding that partners tend to be simi- 
lar in many respects, but especially in atti- 
tudes or personality (e.g., Byrne, 1971, 
1997). We are concerned here not with the 
validity or range of applicability of these 
explanations (for review, see Hinde, 1997), 
but would emphasize that the self-concept 
is a common factor in many of them.3 The 
following examples may be mentioned. 
(a) Social pressure or social norms often 
require choice of a similar partner. The 
3. Similarity consequent upon propinquity or inher- 
ited predispositions is not considered. 
sources of such norms are complex, but 
they involve the relations between the 
self-concepts (or self-systems) of indi- 
viduaIs growing up and identifying with 
the group or groups in which they are 
living and incorporating the norms and 
values of those groups into their own 
self-concepts. 
(b) Priority preferential pairing. The sug- 
gestion here is that the more attractive 
individuals pair off first, thereby re- 
moving themselves from the pool of 
possible partners, and so on. This im- 
plies that individuals who see them- 
selves as attractive seek out another 
whom they see as comparable to them- 
selves. 
(c) Similarity fuute de mieux. This implies 
that “like associates with like” not out 
of preference for someone like them- 
selves but because each assumes that 
the costs of obtaining anyone better 
would be too great. In other words, this 
process involves comparison between 
the self-concept and the perceived 
qualities of the other. 
(d) Acquisition of similarity. Similarity in 
attitudes or personality could be the 
consequence rather than the cause of 
the association. As we have seen, the 
formation of a close relationship can be 
viewed as the merging of two selves: In 
the process the self-concept of each in- 
dividual embraces and thus becomes 
more similar to that of the other. 
(e) Similarity per se is reinforcing. A 
number of possible mechanisms have 
been suggested. Similarity could foster 
communication or minimize tension; 
for instance, norms and values incorpo- 
rated in the self-concepts (or self- 
systems) of the partners would be simi- 
lar and ease the course of communica- 
tion. As another possibility, similarity 
could provide confirmation of the val- 
ues incorporated in the self-concepts of 
the two individuals. As Byrne (1971, 
1997) has stressed, the important issue 
is the meaning attached to the similar- 
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ity. An important distinction here is be- 
tween individuals who claim that their 
actions depend on their own inner feel- 
ings and attitudes (low self-monitors) 
and those who believe their actions are 
determined largely by the environment 
(high self-monitors) (Snyder, 1979). For 
high self-monitors, activity similarity 
has been found to be more important 
than attitude similarity, but for low self- 
monitors the opposite is the case or at- 
traction is based on general feelings of 
liking. Low self-monitors attempt to 
display what they see as their own 
selves in every situation (Jamieson, Ly- 
don, & Zanna, 1987; Snyder, Gangestad 
& Simpson, 1983; Snyder & Simpson, 
1984).4 
Similarity and self-esteem. In general, 
self-esteem may be enhanced by a part- 
ner who is seen to be similar because 
the similarity is viewed as supporting 
the individual’s own views. As noted 
already, self-esteem may be enhanced 
in a relationship if the partner shines in 
activities that are not self-defining for 
the individual concerned, who can thus 
bask in the partner’s glory. But if the 
partner is involved in activities that are 
self-defining for the individual, the lat- 
ter is likely to associate with someone 
who does less well or equally well to 
her or himself (Tesser, 1988; see also 
Rosenberg, 1988). 
Similarity and being liked. Someone 
who saw hedhimself as similar to an- 
other would be more likely to be at- 
tracted to that person than to someone 
whose self-concept was very different. 
Similarity and role satisfaction. It has 
been suggested that the extent to which 
4. This dimension is also related to other aspects of 
interpersonal behavior. High self-monitor students, 
as compared with low self-monitors, are attracted 
to the external characteristics rather than psycho- 
logical characteristics of others; are more promis- 
cuous in their sexual relations; and are more ready 
to have sexual relations with someone to whom 
they are not psychologically close (Snyder, Simp- 
son, & Gangestad, 1986). 
an individual finds role satisfaction 
with another perceived as similar to, or 
different from, oneself will depend on 
the individual’s self-concept. Individu- 
als with high self-esteem will choose 
others like themselves; those with low 
self-esteem will choose someone dif- 
ferent. Thus again, the role of similarity 
in attraction is mediated by the self- 
concept. 
To repeat, we are not concerned here 
with the validity of these explanations, but 
we wish only to point out their relation to 
the self-concept. 
As another example of diverse explana- 
tions for a common phenomenon, consider 
the fact that individuals like to do positive 
things for those whom they love-a fact 
related to the finding that the investment 
made in a relationship is related to commit- 
ment and continuity (Lund, 1985; Rusbult 
& Buunk, 1993). A folk psychology view 
would be that, of course, one wants to 
please those whom one loves, and that one 
naturally wants to make a loved one happy. 
This has an element of circularity-would 
you call it love if you did not want to make 
the partner happy? However, here again a 
variety of possible mechanisms can be seen 
as mediated by the self-concept: 
Aron and Aron’s (1986) depiction of a 
loving relationship as including the 
other in the self provides an immedi- 
ately appealing explanation; by pleasing 
the other you are in fact pleasing the 
self. 
Exchange theories argue that one 
makes sacrifices in the hope of future 
gains, or to maintain the relationship so 
as not to lose one’s investment in it. But 
what is the future gain that is antici- 
pated? Often it is a relationship that 
permits the creation or maintenance of 
congruency in the self-concept-a rela- 
tionship that can confirm one’s view of 
oneself as a loving person, a powerful 
person, a kind person, or whatever the 
case may be. 
Interdependence theory (e.g., Kelley, 
1979) takes a step further by stressing 
that successful interaction must involve 
the continuity of the relationship, and 
thus the continued satisfaction of both 
partners. In other words, each must try to 
bring about congruency for the partner’s 
self-concept as well as his or her own. 
In a modification of exchange theory, 
resource theory, Foa and Foa (1974) 
point out that the various resources ex- 
changed in relationships have different 
properties. If A gives B some money, A 
has that much less. However, if A gives 
B love,A has more (or at least feels her 
or himself to have more). Such a view is 
of course compatible with the proposi- 
tion that loving involves including the 
other in the self, for one is in fact giving 
love to part of oneself. Another mecha- 
nism compatible with resource theory 
would be as follows. If A gives B money 
in a prearranged deal. A may see him- 
self as having made a good investment, 
in which case he sees himself as wise or 
crafty, perhaps thereby confirming a 
self-concept, and thus looks for appro- 
priate returns. Alternatively, A may be 
confirming a self-concept of himself as 
altruistic, in which case the giving is its 
own reward and no further gift is called 
for even if resources are available. In 
either case the self-concept is affected. 
But if A gives B love,A sees himself as a 
loving person. If there is the least doubt 
that reciprocation will be forthcoming 
(and that is at least sometimes the case), 
this self-concept will need confirmation. 
Reciprocation can be made more likely 
and congruency can be achieved if A 
gives more love. 
Sacrifice on behalf of one whom one 
loves may be related to social norms. 
These norms usually prescribe that one 
should be willing to incur costs in close 
relationships, and this is the more so 
the closer the relationship. If one sees 
oneself as a person who conforms to 
social norms, one likes oneself if one 
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(f) Balance theory also provides a perspec- 
tive here. One likes to perceive oneself 
positively. If one gives something (or 
some time) valued by both to another 
whom one loves, that person’s view of 
oneself is likely to be enhanced as a con- 
sequence. The evidence indicates that 
both the other’s esteem, and congru- 
ency of the other’s evaluation of oneself 
with one’s own self-opinion, augment 
liking of the other (Deutsch & Solomon, 
1959). 
(g) If a person gives to someone whom he 
or she likes, it usually seems that the 
giving is due to the liking, but it may also 
be the case that the liking is due to the 
giving. The person may want to see the 
other as desirable because it is in har- 
mony with his or her own self-concept 
that he or she should love someone who 
is worthy of his or her efforts (Murray & 
Holmes, 1996). 
An alternative theoretical approach to 
the link between sacrifice and love in- 
volves seeing two people in a relation- 
ship as a two-person group. A group 
member likes and is more willing to 
help a fellow group member than an 
outsider (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). But 
group membership implies that one’s 
self-concept (or self-system) includes 
being a member of that group. Once 
again, the self-concept is involved. 
Conclusion 
The study of relationships burgeoned when 
it was accepted that relationships had prop- 
erties additional to those of individual-level 
behavior, and should thus be studied as en- 
tities in their own right. However, we sup- 
port the view that full understanding of re- 
lationships requires a focus not only at the 
relationship level but also at the individual 
level, with the participants being treated 
more or less independently of each other. 
Analysis leads from relationships to inter- 
actions, and to understand interactions it is 
necessary to understand the relations be- 
sees oneself as doing so. tween behavior and the self-concept. The 
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formation of, and changes in, a relationship 
involve changes to the self-concepts (or 
self-systems) of the participants (and vice 
versa). Most of the properties of relation- 
ships refer ultimately to self-concepts of the 
participants. Moreover, many relationship- 
level phenomena can be partly explained 
by reference to the self-concept. 
Understanding of any phenomenon re- 
quires analysis and then resynthesis of the 
products of analysis. Analyzing relation- 
ships through interactions to effects on, and 
influences of, the self-concept will permit a 
resynthesis that will provide a deeper and 
more coherent understanding of relation- 
ships, and one that will be more available to 
clinicians. 
Of course, the self-concept is a complex 
and subtle concept. Although a person’s 
self-concept can be investigated by the sim- 
ple and apparently objective technique of 
asking for a self-description, much fuzziness 
remains. For instance, how much detail is 
required? Under what range of circum- 
stances should the description be elicited? 
It certainly cannot be said that the self- 
concept has sufficiently hard edges to an- 
swer such questions definitively. That, how- 
ever, does not mean that aspects of how 
individuals see themselves cannot be used 
more extensively as objective data. The pre- 
ceding discussion indicates that use of the 
self- concept may prove to have great value 
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